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Hilary Young*  The Scope of Canadian Defamation
 Injunctions
Free speech is engaged when courts enjoin defamatory or allegedly defamatory 
speech on an interlocutory or permanent basis. This paper explores the justifiable 
scope of defamation injunctions and compares that to what courts do. 
The study reveals that Canadian defamation injunctions regularly go far beyond 
what is justifiable. For example, 16% of defamation injunctions involved orders not 
to speak about the plaintiff at all, which is overbroad since that includes true and 
otherwise lawful speech. Other orders prohibit saying disparaging (as opposed to 
unlawful) things—again overbroad. Orders not to defame may be vague because 
it is unclear whether, in context, a future publication will be defamatory. There are 
narrow circumstances in which orders not to defame may be justified but such 
orders are often made when a narrower injunction—or none at all—would be 
appropriate.
La liberté d'expression est engagée lorsque les tribunaux ordonnent l'interdiction 
d'un discours diffamatoire ou prétendument diffamatoire sur une base interlocutoire 
ou permanente. Cet article examine dans quelle mesure les injonctions en matière 
de diffamation sont justifiables et com-pare cela à ce que font les tribunaux. 
L'étude révèle que les injonctions canadiennes en matière de diffamation vont 
régulièrement bien au-delà de ce qui est justifiable. Par exemple, 16 % des 
injonctions en diffamation consistaient en des or-donnances interdisant de ne pas 
parler du tout du plaignant, ce qui dépasse la mesure puisque cela inclut des 
propos vrais et par ailleurs légaux. D'autres ordonnances interdisent de dire des 
choses dé-sobligeantes (par opposition à illégales), ce qui également dépasse 
la mesure. Les ordonnances de non diffamation peuvent être vagues parce qu'il 
n'est pas clair si, dans le contexte, une future publication sera diffamatoire. Il 
existe des circonstances limitées dans lesquelles les ordonnances de non diffama-
tion peuvent être justifiées, mais de telles ordonnances sont souvent rendues 
lorsqu'une injonction de portée plus limitée voire aucune, serait appropriée.
* Professor, University of New Brunswick Faculty of Law. Professor Young is grateful to Colleen 
Thrasher and Chantalle Briggs for their excellent research assistance, and to the Foundation for Legal 
Research and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council for their research funding.
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Introduction
I. Values in drafting injunctions: Minimal impairment and precision







This article assesses the appropriate and actual scope of injunctions in 
Canadian defamation actions. While I argue that defamation injunctions 
can be appropriate if narrowly tailored, the case law demonstrates that 
unnecessarily broad and vague defamation injunctions are commonly 
ordered in Canada.
Until recently, there was controversy in the United States as to 
whether defamation injunctions—that is, court orders prohibiting speech 
alleged or proven to be defamatory, or ordering its removal—were ever 
constitutionally permissible.1 Canadian law has long permitted such 
injunctions, especially where a court has found the speech to be defamatory, 
while recognizing the potential threat they pose to freedom of expression. 
Freedom of expression is an important Canadian value and receives 
1.	 David	Ardia	begins	his	paper	on	defamation	injunctions	by	stating:	“It	has	long	been	a	fixture	
of	Anglo-American	 law	 that	 libel	 plaintiffs	 are	 not	 entitled	 to	 injunctive	 relief;	 their	 remedies	 are	
solely monetary” (“Freedom of Speech, Defamation and Injunctions” (2013) 55 W & Mary L Rev 1 
at 4). The well-known phrase “equity will not enjoin a libel” is frequently cited. See e.g. Kramer v 
Thompson,	947	F	(2nd)	666,	677,	677	(3d	Cir	1991);	Erwin	Chemerinsky,	“Injunctions	in	Defamation	
Cases”	(2007)	57:2	Syracuse	L	Rev	157;	Rodney	A.	Smolla,	Law of Defamation, 2nd ed (Toronto: 
Thomson	Reuters,	2012)	at	§	9:85;		Ann	Motto,	“‘Equity	Will	Not	Enjoin	a	Libel’:	Well	Actually,	Yes,	
It	Will”	(2016)	11	Seventh	Circuit	Rev	271.	Specifically,	in	the	US,	such	injunctions	are	thought	to	be	
a form of prior restraint prohibited by the First Amendment of the US Constitution. That said, there 
is “an emerging modern trend” that permanent (as opposed to interlocutory) defamation injunctions 
are	permissible	where	they	only	prohibit	the	repetition	of	specific	imputations	that	have	been	found	to	
be defamatory (McCarthy v Fuller, 810 F (3d) 456 at 464 (7th Cir 2015)). As we shall see, these are 
Ardia’s	Type IV injunctions. 
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significant	legal	protection.2 And although the common law of defamation 
is not subject to constitutional scrutiny in Canada, any restrictions on 
expression	by	the	courts	should	be	justifiable.	
There are several ways in which defamation injunctions can 
unjustifiably	 interfere	 with	 free	 speech.	 They	 can	 be	 ordered	 in	
inappropriate circumstances, provide inadequate guidance as to what not 
to say, and can be broader in scope than necessary. This article addresses 
these	 last	 two	 issues,	 which	 together	 reflect	 the	 appropriate	 scope	 of	
defamation injunctions. The appropriate scope must be considered in light 
of	the	internet’s	ability	to	de-contextualize—for	example,	through	search	
engine results—and the ability of online statements to spread rapidly and to 
persist.	The	way	in	which	information	flows	is	relevant	to	the	permissible	
scope of injunctions because speech initially published in one context may 
be	repeated	in	another,	such	that	the	meaning	and	effect	of	that	speech	may	
be	different.	My	research	suggests	that	most	cases	in	which	an	injunction	
is sought involve digital communication.3 
Certain kinds of injunctions are improper and should never be 
ordered. Most obviously, overbroad injunctions that enjoin lawful as well 
an unlawful speech should constitute legal error, reversible on appeal. 
Unclear injunctions are also problematic, as the defendant is not put on 
notice as to what speech is enjoined. This is considered in the context of 
enjoining further “defamatory” statements. Yet the case law shows that 
judges regularly order unnecessarily broad defamation injunctions and 
sometimes order vague ones. This may be more likely where defendants 
are self- or unrepresented.4
I conclude that injunctions prohibiting repeating imputations already 
found to be defamatory, or requiring takedowns of such publications, are 
sometimes	 justifiable.	Particularly	given	 the	potential	effects	of	 internet	
2.	 For	example,	freedom	of	expression	is	protected	in	s	2(b)	of	Canada’s	Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (The Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 
11). And while defamation law is not subject to Charter review, it must evolve in accordance with 
Canadian values, including Charter values. Freedom of expression is therefore often explicitly 
mentioned when judges make incremental changes to the law of defamation. See e.g. Grant v Torstar 
Corp, 2009 SCC 61 at paras 42-57.
3.	 As	discussed	in	Section	3	below,	I	identified	54	cases	between	2007	and	2017	in	which	defamation	
injunctions	were	ordered	and	there	was	sufficient	detail	in	the	reasons	to	permit	categorization.	44/53	
of these, or 83 per cent, concerned publication on the internet. (The denominator is 53 because for one 
case	it	was	unclear	whether	internet	publication	was	involved.)	Another	6/53	(11	per	cent)	involved	
email	publication.	Only	3/53	(6	per	cent)	involved	neither.	And	while	I	cannot	say	what	percentage	
of defamation cases in that time frame generally involved online publication, a study of a cases from 
2003-2013 showed only 14 per cent of cases involved internet publication and a further 9 per cent 
involved	email.	See	Hilary	Young,	“The	Canadian	Defamation	Action:	An	Empirical	Study”	(2018)	
95:3 Can Bar Rev 591 at 605.
4. See page 24 below.
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publication, I also conclude that under certain narrow circumstances it 
is	 justifiable	 to	 enjoin	 a	 defendant	 from	 further	 defaming	 the	 plaintiff.	
However, injunctions granted in Canada regularly go far beyond these 
justifiable	circumstances.
I. Values in drafting injunctions: Minimal impairment and precision
It is important to get the scope of defamation injunctions right. Freedom of 
expression	is	implicated,	but	so	is	the	plaintiff’s	reputation.	To	determine	
the appropriate scope of injunctions, we must understand their purpose. 
The main purpose of injunctions in defamation cases, whether they be 
prohibitive (e.g. do-not-say-x orders) or mandatory (e.g. takedown orders), 
is to prevent additional irreparable reputational harm. For mandatory 
orders, the expectation must be that without such an order new audiences 
will see the libel, either in its original location or because the statement 
may spread more widely. For prohibitive injunctions, the expectation 
must be that the injunction is necessary to prevent a new libel, including 
a repetition. However, in these cases, judges should still consider the 
necessity of making a speech-infringing order. Publishing a libel is already 
unlawful, and if the threat of a damages award serves as a deterrent there 
is no need to resort to injunctions and potential contempt proceedings. 
Sometimes, however, injunctions are necessary to prevent reputational 
harm.
In other words, injunctions seek to prevent future harm to reputation5 




goal of preventing additional irreparable reputation harm. 
Overbroad orders risk proscribing lawful speech and potentially 
punishing speakers with penalties including imprisonment. While it may 
be	difficult	to	decide	exactly	how	broad	a	particular	order	should	be,	the	
5. “It may be that the granting of an injunction should be distinguished from the assessment of 
damages. The latter compensates for harm that has already occurred. The former, while relying on 
publications that have already taken place, is directed to limiting the harm that has been done by 
preventing prospective damage that has not yet taken place.” Canadian National Railway Company v 
Google Inc, 2010 ONSC 3121 at para 13.
6. I do not address in this paper the issue of whether injunctions should be ordered if they are likely 
to	be	ineffective,	but	judges	have	sometimes	disagreed	about	this.	In	Google Inc v Equustek Solutions 
Inc, 2017 SCC 34 [Equustek], the dissenting judges would have refused to grant the injunction sought 
in	part	because	it	would	not	be	effective	(at	paras	77-79).	And	while	there	is	a	general	rule	that	equity	
should	not	support	ineffective	orders,	the	Ontario	Court	of	Appeal	refused	to	therefore	simply	“throw	
up their collective hands in despair” whenever a libel is published on the internet (Barrick Gold Corp 
v Lopehandia (2004), 71 OR (3d) 416 at para 75, 239 DLR (4th) 577 (ONCA) [Barrick Gold].
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principle that orders should be minimally impairing of speech is, I think, 
uncontroversial. According to the Ontario and British Columbia Courts 
of	Appeal,	“injunctive	relief	must	be	broad	enough	to	be	effective	but	no	
broader	than	reasonably	necessary	to	effect	compliance.”7
In particular, orders should rarely enjoin lawful speech. This is not 
because lawful conduct may not be enjoined,8 but rather because there is 
no compelling reason to enjoin lawful speech—a narrower injunction is 
usually available. The extent to which injunctions should enjoin unlawful 
speech	that	isn’t	the	subject	of	litigation	is	discussed	below.	As	a	starting	
point, however, orders should be as narrow as possible to achieve the 
legitimate ends the injunction seeks to achieve.
In addition, injunction orders should be clear and precise. “Since 
a	 breach	 of	 an	 injunction	 may	 have	 the	 consequences	 of	 a	 fine	 and	
imprisonment, the language of an injunction should clearly set forth what 
is prohibited.”9 Thus, for example, where it was not clear when a party 
was supposed to make a payment ordered, failure to pay did not constitute 
contempt.10 
Scope issues are not limited to the breadth and precision of the order 
itself but also include the application of injunctions to third parties and the 
extra-territorial scope of injunctions. However, these issues are beyond 
the scope of this paper.11 I focus here on the kind of speech an injunction 
should prohibit, rather than where or to whom the order should apply.
II. Canadian defamation injunctions
I searched the defamation case law between 2007 and 2017 in all Canadian 
provinces other than Quebec12	and	identified	cases	in	which	an	injunction	
was granted.13 These included permanent and interlocutory injunctions, 
7. Cambie Surgeries Corp v British Columbia (Medical Services Commission), 2010 BCCA 396 
at para 39, cited in Labourers’ International Union of North America, Local 183 v Castellano, 2020 
ONCA 71 at para 18 [Labourers’ International].
8. See e.g. Doug Rendleman, “The Defamation Injunction Meets the Prior Restraint Doctrine” 
(2019)	615	San	Diego	L	Rev	at	672:	“An	injunction	may	govern	a	defendant’s	conduct	that	the	civil	
law	doesn’t.”
9. Campbell v Cartmell (1999), 104 OTC 349 (SCJ) at para 60, 1999 CarswellOnt 2967.
10. Skybound Dev Ltd v Hughes Properties Ltd, [1988] 5 WWR 355 at para 38, 24 BCLR (2d) 1 
(BCCA). See also Dare Foods (Biscuit Division) Ltd et al v Gill et al (1972), [1973] 1 OR 637, 1972 
CanLII 506 (ONSC). 
11. Note, however, that the Supreme Court of Canada has recently showed itself willing to impose 
injunctions	with	extra-territorial	effect	and	injunctions	that	bind	third	parties.	See	Equustek, supra note 
6.
12.	 Quebec	has	a	civil	law	system	and	its	defamation	laws	are	somewhat	different	than	those	in	other	
provinces. Its case law was therefore excluded from the search.
13.	 The	methodology	was	to	search	three	different	databases,	Quicklaw,	Westlaw	and	CanLII,	using	
search terms appropriate to those platforms. They usually included “defam” with an expander, ie, 
defamation, defamatory, defaming, defamed. To gather preliminary data, the search terms “injunct” 
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though most were permanent. This does not mean more permanent 
injunctions	are	ordered	than	interlocutory	ones.	Rather,	this	likely	reflects	
a	greater	tendency	to	report	final	decisions	than	interlocutory	ones.	That	
said, the very high threshold for obtaining an interlocutory injunction 
in defamation cases14 may also be a factor. The data set consisted of 62 
orders from 54 cases.15	 These	 do	 not	 reflect	 all	 the	 orders	 that	 would	
have been made during this time period because some cases with orders 
would not have been reported, and some may have been reported without 
mentioning	the	order	or	setting	out	its	terms	in	sufficient	detail	to	permit	
categorization. Yet others may not have been caught by the search terms.16 
While the data set is necessarily incomplete, there is no reason to think the 
injunctions studied are not representative. The data set is therefore helpful 
in assessing the kinds of orders that are made and their relative frequency, 
though given the small size of the data set, caution is warranted.17
To analyze Canadian injunctions, I adopt a typology created by US 
scholar,	David	Ardia,	which	categorizes	injunctions	based	on	differences	
in both breadth and clarity.18	First,	 I	 set	out	Ardia’s	 typology	of	 speech	
injunctions,	 considering	 the	 justifiability	 of	 each	 kind	 in	 the	 Canadian	
context. I then categorize Canadian defamation injunction orders according 
to this typology. Finally, I consider whether Canadian injunction orders 
are unnecessarily broad or vague. I found that in many cases, a narrower 
and clearer injunction was possible and apparently appropriate.
Ardia	identifies	four	types	of	defamation	injunction:	
• Type I is the broadest and prohibits the defendant from making 
any	statements	at	all	about	the	plaintiff.19 
• Type II prohibits making any defamatory statements about the 
and	“enjoin”	(with	expanders)	were	used.	Each	case	was	read	and	categorized,	with	duplicates	and	
false positives excluded.
14. Interlocutory injunctions in defamation should be granted only in the “rarest and clearest of 
cases.” Canada Metal Co Ltd et al v Canadian Broadcasting Corp et al [1975], 7 OR (2d) 261 at para 
2, 55 DLR (3d) 42 (Ont Sup Ct) [Canada Metal]. This rule has been “universally and consistently” 
applied since Bonnard v Perryman and other nineteenth century cases: ibid at para 3.
15.	 Where	a	case	resulted	in	orders	of	more	than	one	type,	according	to	David	Ardia’s	typology	of	
defamation injunctions, they were counted as distinct orders. There are many other ways of counting 
orders and many orders had multiple terms. The purpose of counting in this way was to be able to 
classify	orders	according	to	Ardia’s	typology,	which	is	described	below.
16. The large number of false positives suggests the search terms were not too narrow. 
17. Thus,	for	example,	while	I	find	that	15	per	cent	of	injunctions	in	the	data	set	were	of	one	type 
and 42 per cent were of another, we cannot at this point conclude either that that is true of Canadian 
injunction	orders	generally	or	that	the	second	type	of	orders	is	more	than	twice	as	prevalent	as	the	first.	
What we can say is that in this data set, which we have no reason to believe is not representative, the 
second type of order was more than twice as frequent as the	first. 
18. Ardia, supra note 1 at 52.
19. Ibid.
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plaintiff.20 
I divide this category into Type IIa and Type IIb. 
o Type IIa enjoins any defamatory statements in the sense of 
disparaging statements or those that satisfy the defamatory 
meaning element of the tort. 
o Type IIb prohibits statements that are defamatory in the 
sense of satisfying all elements of the tort and none of the 
defences. 
• Type III injunctions enjoin the publication of words with a 
particular imputation, where that imputation has not been found 
to be defamatory.21
• Type IV prohibits making statements whose imputations have 
been found to be defamatory.22
1. Type I
Type I,	which	prohibits	all	speech	about	the	plaintiff,	is	obviously	overbroad	
as it enjoins not only unlawful speech but also lawful speech. For example, 
it	would	prohibit	the	defendant	from	saying	true	things	about	the	plaintiff,	
such as telling people that the defendant had been engaged in litigation 
with	the	plaintiff.	It	would	even	prohibit	the	defendant	from	retracting	her	
original libel. This is because saying that she was wrong all along and that 
the	original	libel	was	untrue	are	statements	about	the	plaintiff.	
As a practical matter, it may be that the defendant would be found in 
contempt of court only for speech that was actually defamatory, but this 
cannot be assumed since lawful acts may be enjoined.23 Courts have noted 
defamation	law’s	chilling	effect	and	have	made	the	law	more	defendant-
friendly	 to	 prevent	 this	 effect.	To	 proscribe	 all	 references	 to	 a	 plaintiff	
risks chilling even lawful speech. The breadth of Type I injunctions results 
in serious interferences with free speech. It is always feasible to craft a 
narrower	injunction	without	unreasonably	risking	a	plaintiff’s	reputation.	
Type I injunctions should never be ordered.
And yet surprisingly, Type I injunctions are relatively common in 
Canada. Of the 62 injunction orders in my data set, ten (16 per cent) were 
Type I injunctions. For example, in Beidas v Pichler, Himel J. ordered the 
following, which includes mandatory and prohibitive terms:
20. Ibid at 53.
21. Ibid at 54.
22. Ibid at 56.
23. See note 8 above.
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1. … an order until trial of this action prohibiting the defendants from 
publishing	any	materials	which	may	tend	to	identify	the	plaintiffs	Beidas,	
Davies and Pallister.
2. The defendants shall delete all references to Beidas, Davies or 
Pallister from any publications to which the defendants have, or can 
obtain access.24
The order is overbroad and was ultimately dissolved for that reason.25 
If	 the	 defendants	were	 to	 say:	 “I’m	being	 sued	by	Beidas,”	 that	would	
violate the injunction, though it would obviously not be defamatory 
because	 it	 does	 not	 impugn	 Beidas’	 reputation	 and	 is	 true.	 Similarly,	
saying “Jennifer Pallister died” would violate the order, even though it 
is true and not defamatory. The defendants would also violate the order 
if they refused to take steps to remove lawful	content	about	the	plaintiffs	
from sites they have access to.
Lest	one	 think	 this	was	simply	a	one-off	mistake	caught	on	appeal,	
consider Craven v Chmura, in which the Ontario Superior Court turned 
its mind to the scope of the injunction and found support in the case law 
for Type I injunctions. Then, citing New York Fries, the	court	justified	the	
breadth of the injunction in Craven v Chmura “to avoid the cost and other 
consequences of future litigation between the parties.”26
The order in New York Fries was as follows:
Consequently, the defendants shall be permanently restrained from 
publishing or broadcasting, or causing to be published, broadcast or 
otherwise disseminated, any statements or other communications 
concerning	New	York	Fries	or	any	of	its	directors,	officers	or	employees,	
except if made in court documents or open court as required to litigate 
Court	File	No.	1543/10	against	New	York	Fries.27
That said, the Ontario Court of Appeal recently amended a Type I 
defamation injunction on the basis that it was overbroad, stating that:
Absent evidence that prohibiting the appellant from making non-
defamatory	statements	is	reasonably	necessary	to	address	the	identified	
likelihood of future defamation, the injunction should not have been cast 
24. See Beidas v Pichler (Legassé) (2008), 294 DLR (4th) 310 at para 40, 2008 CanLII 26255 [ON 
SCDC). 
25. A three-judge panel of the Ontario Superior Court agreed and dissolved the orders as being 
too broad. They replaced them with an order enjoining the defendants from “in any way publishing, 
continuing	to	publish	or	otherwise	disseminating	the	article	or	statement	known	as	‘A	Silhouette	of	
Doom’”	(ibid at para 71). While narrower, this may still be too broad since the article presumably 
contains lawful as well as unlawful speech.
26. Craven v Chmura, 2016 ONSC 2406 at para 20.
27. 122164 Canada Limited v CM Takacs Holdings Corp et al, 2012 ONSC 6338 at para 37.
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so broadly that it captured non-defamatory statements.28
In my view, this statement does not go far enough, since it implies that such 
broad orders may sometimes be necessary to prevent future defamation. 
I do not believe this is the case. Regardless, the circumstances in which a 
Type I order would be necessary must be exceedingly rare. These orders 
go far beyond what should be necessary to prevent unlawful reputational 
harm	 to	 the	 plaintiffs.	 They	 would	 prevent	 all	 manner	 of	 true	 speech,	
including speech on matters of public interest. The judge in Craven was 
presumably concerned that the defendant would not be silenced and his 
speech could not be predicted. He stated he was concerned about the costs 
and inconvenience of future litigation. But if a defendant is not prepared to 
abide by a narrower order (for example, a Type II “do not defame” order), 
it is unclear why she would abide by a broader one. Further, enforcing 
contempt orders is costly too. More importantly, the injustice of proscribing 




Type II injunctions are more defensible as they are limited to defamatory 
speech	about	the	plaintiff.	They	proscribe	any	further	defamatory	speech,	
meaning speech not yet determined to be defamatory (unlike Type IV which, 
as we shall see, is limited to speech already judged to be defamatory). This 
might seem unproblematic, in that only illegal content will be enjoined. 
There are, however, two potential problems with Type II injunctions: they 
may be vague and are arguably overbroad. 
While Ardia treats all injunctions prohibiting future defamation as 
Type II, it is useful to distinguish between two kinds of Type II injunctions, 
since	 they	raise	different	 issues.29 First, there are injunctions that enjoin 
any further communications with disparaging or defamatory meaning, 
regardless of whether other elements or defences are made out.30 I refer 
to these as Type IIa. Alternatively, Type IIb injunctions prohibit future 
defamation in the sense of making out the tort—satisfying all of the 
elements and none of the defences. For reasons set out below, Type IIa 
28. Labourers’ International, supra note 7 at para 20.
29. I am grateful to Norman Siebrasse for suggesting this approach.
30. While purists may consider this the only true meaning of defamatory, the word is commonly used 
to refer both to the defamatory meaning element of the tort and to the tort itself. Given this, the term 
on	its	own	is	ambiguous,	much	like	“negligence”	is.	What’s	more,	the	analysis	of	Type II injunctions 
below	reveals	that	judges	differ	in	whether	they	mean	defamatory	in	the	sense	of	defamatory	meaning	
or in the sense of all of the elements and none of the defences being made out.
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orders are never defensible while Type IIb are at least arguably sometimes 
defensible.
Where an order simply proscribes “defamatory” communications, it is 
unclear whether this is a Type IIa or Type IIb order. This is because there 
is an inherent ambiguity in the word “defamatory.” “Defamatory” can 
mean that the tort of defamation is made out, or only that the element of 
defamatory meaning is made out—that is, that the communication would 
make	an	ordinary	person	think	less	of	the	plaintiff.	This	ambiguity	is	in	
itself problematic as it does not put the defendant on notice as to what 
conduct will breach the injunction. The ambiguity also makes enforcing 
such an order challenging, as it is harder to prove the mens rea or intent 
required for contempt when the order is unclear. Ambiguity was one 
reason why the judge in Seikhon v Dhillon refused to order the requested 
Type II injunction.31
Ambiguity is not the only problem. An order prohibiting disparaging 
or defamatory (in the sense of defamatory meaning) communications is 
overbroad. It captures lawful speech, including true speech, since truth is 
a defence. Like Type I orders, this is problematic and easily avoidable in 
most, if not all, circumstances and so Type IIa orders	should	effectively	
never be made.
Given the ambiguity in the word “defamatory,” one might wonder 
whether Type IIa orders	actually	exist.	That	is,	we	might	give	the	benefit	
of the doubt to judges that their Type II orders are all Type IIb orders that 
enjoin	the	tort	of	defamation.	In	the	study,	26/62	or	42	per	cent	of	orders	
were Type II, making it the most common type of injunction. While most 
(19/26	or	73	per	cent)	Type II orders were ambiguous as to whether they 
were Type IIa or Type IIb, it is clear that some orders are, indeed, Type IIa 
orders. 
For example, in Zall v Zall, an injunction was granted on the following 
terms:
31. Seikhon v Dhillon, 2017 BCSC 2525 at para 173: 
Further, I have concerns about the form of the order sought, which would simply enjoin 
Mr. Dhillon from “the publication or distribution… of any defamatory statements about…
the	plaintiffs.”	This	language	fails	to	make	clear	whether	it	would	be	a	breach	of	the	order	
for	Mr.	Dhillon	to	publish	a	statement	about	the	plaintiffs	that	would	tend	to	lower	their	
reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person if that statement was true. In other words, 
it is not clear, as proposed, whether it would be necessary to determine the truth of any 
such statement in order to know whether the order had been breached. Ascertaining the 
truth would almost certainly require a trial.  In my view, this is likely to give rise to more 
problems than it resolves, including protracted litigation about whether Mr. Dhillon is in 
contempt	of	court	in	circumstances	where	he	says	something	derogatory	about	the	plaintiffs	
but then pleads truth.
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1. The defendant, Tammi Zall, is enjoined and restrained from the 
publication or distribution on the internet, or by any other method or 
medium, of any defamatory statements about or referring in any other 
way	to	the	plaintiff,	John	Zall…
…
3. For the purposes of this order, “defamatory” means any publication 
which tends to lower a person in the estimation of right-thinking members 
of society or to expose a person to hatred, contempt or ridicule…32
A similar clause, clarifying that “defamatory” means “defamatory 
meaning,” was found in Rodrigues v Rodrigues.33 Three other Type II orders 
were clearly Type IIa orders.34 One enjoined “accusatory or disparaging 
allegations,”35 another “disparaging” comments.36 Note that the latter 
order was made following a discussion of an earlier order, which the judge 
found vague because it referred simply to “defamatory” statements:
I asked counsel in argument whether it was possibly ambiguous to use 
the term “defamatory”. That is a term that is very meaningful to lawyers 
and judges, and has a legal meaning as a term of art. Not everyone knows 
that our law of defamation provides a true statement can be defamatory, 
and that whether it is true or not is part of the consideration of whether 
there is a defence to the defamation.37
This suggests an awareness of the problem with vague orders, but not the 
problem of enjoining disparaging but lawful speech, such as statements 
that are true, privileged or fair comment. 
Thus,	7/26	Type II orders	(27	per	cent)	were	identifiable	as	Type IIa 
orders. This amounts to 13 per cent of all orders in the data set. 
The	 other	 19/26	 (73	 per	 cent)	 of	 Type II orders, which enjoin 
defaming	 the	plaintiff,	 are	 ambiguous,38 but let us assume that they are 
Type IIb orders that enjoin committing the tort of defamation. They are 
32. Zall v Zall, 2016 BCSC 1730 at para 99.
33. Rodrigues v Rodrigues, 2013 ABQB 718 at para 49.
34. See Gee Nam John et al v Byung Kyu Lee et al, 2009 BCSC 1157 [Gee Nam John]	at	para	2;	
Passey v Henry, 2016 BCSC 1766 [Passey] at	para	26;	Hutchens v SCAM.COM, 2011 ONSC 56 at 
para 105. In addition, two others were type IIa because they enjoined “false or malicious” statements 
rather than unlawfully defamatory ones. See Kim v Dongpo News, 2013 ONSC 4426 [Kim]	at	para	63;	
Emerald Passport Inc v MacIntosh, 2008 BCSC 1289 at para 6.
35. Gee Nam John, supra note 34 at para 2.
36. Passey, supra note 34 at para 26.
37. Ibid at para 22.
38. Surprisingly, given the inherent ambiguity in the words “defamation” and “defamatory,” and 
given the need in enjoining conduct to be clear about what is prohibited, none of the Type II orders 
specified	 that	 they	enjoined	defamation	 in	 the	sense	of	satisfying	all	 the	elements	and	none	of	 the	
defences.
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essentially do-not-defame orders or “obey the law” orders. They prohibit 
future	instances	of	the	tort	of	defamation	against	the	plaintiff,	including	
statements that were unrelated to the one that was litigated and which 
were not foreseeable. Given that defamation is unlawful, some might 
think such orders unproblematic. However, they transform what would 
otherwise be tortious conduct into civil or criminal contempt. For this 
reason, Ardia, Chemerinsky and Rendleman, discussing US law, view 
Type IIb injunctions as impermissible prior restraints on speech.39 As 
discussed	below,	however,	they	are	sometimes,	though	rarely,	justifiable	
in the Canadian context.
As noted above, Type IIb orders are vague, in that what is defamatory 
is	 notoriously	 difficult	 to	 assess	 in	 advance.40 Allegations may not be 
defamatory if they are true, if they lack credibility, if they were published 
responsibly or if they were privileged. Thus, the same words might be 
defamatory in one context (e.g. published in a newspaper) and not in another 
(e.g. spoken in the House of Commons). To know what is defamatory, and 
what they are therefore enjoined from saying, defendants may need to 
know how their speech will be interpreted by ordinary people, whether it 
can be proven to be true (as opposed to whether they believe it to be true), 
whether	they	took	sufficient	steps	to	verify	before	publishing,	or	whether	
publication was on an occasion of privilege. Contempt of court requires 
that intent to violate the order be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This 
only means, however, that defendants must have spoken deliberately with 
knowledge of the existence of the order. They need not have knowingly 
breached the order.41 Vague orders are therefore problematic and should 
be avoided unless absolutely necessary. In the US context they are likely 
unconstitutional: Ardia cites Chief Justice Hughes of the United States 
Supreme Court as stating that Type II injunctions are the “essence of 
39. For Ardia see Ardia, supra note 1 at 53-54. Chemerinsky considers all defamation injunctions 
that prevent future speech to be constitutionally impermissible in the United States, see Chemerinsky, 
supra note 1 at 173. For Rendleman, see Rendleman, supra note 8 at 674: “A court today ought to 
rule	 that	 a	 “no-defamation”	 injunction	 is	 both	 too	broad	 and	 too	vague.	 It	 forbids	 the	defendant’s	
expression that had not already been found to be defamatory, and it provides the defendant with 
insufficient	notice	of	expressions	that	would	violate	it.”	
40. While a Type II order need not, in theory, involve future publication, where the issue is taking 
down content already published, the order tends to be specifically	aimed	at	that	publication,	rather	than	
at defamatory statements generally.
41. “The core elements of civil contempt are knowledge of the order and the intentional commission 
of an act which is in fact prohibited by it.” Robert Sharpe, Injunctions and Specific Performance, 5th ed 
(Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2017) at 6-18. For criminal contempt, there must be “intent, knowledge 
or recklessness as to the fact that the public disobedience will tend to deprecate the authority of the 
court.” Ibid at 6-4.
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censorship,”42 and Chemerinsky refers to “deep-seated American hostility 
to prior restraints.”43
Consider, for example, the permanent injunction in Barrick Gold v 
Lopehandia. It prohibits the defendants from: “disseminating, posting 
on the Internet or publishing further defamatory statements concerning 
Barrick	or	its	officers,	directors	or	employees.”44 It does not just prohibit 
communicating the imputations that have been found to be defamatory. It 
prohibits	all	future	libels.	Usually,	plaintiffs	must	sue	in	relation	to	new	
libels, since the usual procedure and remedy for defamation is a tort action 
and	damages	rather	than	contempt	of	court	and	fines	or	a	prison	sentence.	
Thus,	if	an	“obey	the	law”	order	is	justifiable,	it	must	be	because	it	is	
necessary and there is presumably no less speech-infringing way to achieve 
the desired end. This is sometimes thought to be the case where there is 
a likelihood that the defendant will continue to defame, in unpredictable 
ways,45 despite having been held liable and despite the prospect of future 
tort	 liability.	 While	 a	 plaintiff	 could	 bring	 another	 defamation	 action	
in such circumstances, this has costs and litigation may already have 
proven	ineffective,	in	that	the	defendant	is	judgment-proof	or	outside	the	
jurisdiction. Some judges have considered Type IIb injunctions necessary 
because impecunious defendants will not be deterred by the possibility of 
further litigation and damages awards that they cannot pay.




awards.”46 In another case, the judge stated: 
it is very likely that the defendant will continue to publish defamatory 
statements	 despite	 the	 finding	 that	 he	 is	 liable	 to	 the	 plaintiffs	 for	
damages…
This	 likelihood	 is	 justified	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 despite	 having	 an	
interim injunction in place requiring the defendant to remove certain 
specified	 defamatory statements from his internet blog and enjoining 
him from publishing further defamatory	statements	about	the	plaintiffs,	
42. Ardia, supra note 1 at 54 citing Near v Minnesota, 283 US 697 (1931) at 713.
43. Chemerinsky, supra note 1 at 166.
44. Barrick Gold, supra, note 6 at para 78.
45. The existence of unpredictability is what might justify a Type IIb order rather than a Type IV 
order,	enjoining	the	repetition	of	specific	imputations	found	to	be	defamatory.	The	Ontario	Court	of	
Appeal in St. Lewis v Rancourt, 2015 ONCA 513 [St. Lewis] may have had unpredictability in mind 
when it referred to “a campaign of defamation and a likelihood that it will continue,” which would 
justify a “broad ongoing injunction” (at para 16).
46. British Columbia Recreation and Parks Association v Zakharia, 2015 BCSC 1650 at para 98.
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he	failed	 to	remove	the	specific	defamatory statements... Furthermore, 
he made new defamatory statements in a blog posting on the internet 
against	 the	 same	plaintiffs	 only	 a	 few	days	 before	 the	 hearing	of	 this	
matter.47
The question is whether the likelihood of further defamation, in 
unpredictable	ways,	justifies	a	Type IIb order. As noted above, in the US 
the answer has tended to be “no.”
In my view, Type IIb injunctions	 are	 sometimes	 justified,	 but	 only	
in narrow circumstances. First, the conditions for any equitable relief 
should	obviously	be	satisfied.	For	 interlocutory	orders,	 this	 includes	the	
likelihood of irreparable harm.48 Permanent injunctions must be necessary, 
meaning there are no adequate alternative remedies,49 and there is likely 
to be continued wrongdoing: “A wrong committed in the past that has 
little or no chance of continuing does not need to be remedied by an order 
enjoining future behavior.”50 Second, such injunctions should be as narrow 
as possible in scope.51
Given this, to justify an injunction, the scope of anticipated further 
defamation	 must	 be	 different	 than	 that	 already	 litigated—otherwise	
a narrower Type IV order, which requires a defendant not to repeat the 
specific	imputations	already	found	to	be	defamatory,	would	be	appropriate.	
It must also be unpredictable, or else a narrower Type III injunction would 
be more appropriate. Finally, it should be the case that the threat of further 
litigation would not deter the defendant from defaming. This will usually 
be because defendants are judgment-proof but it could also be that they 
are	 sufficiently	wealthy	 to	 pay	 any	 damages	 award,	 including	 an	 order	
for punitive damages. The possibility of contempt prevents wealthy 
defendants	from	effectively	purchasing	a	license	to	defame.	
To these existing requirements I would add that the predicted future 
defamation should not only be defamatory (in the Type IIb sense of contrary 
to defamation law, including defences). It should also be likely to cause 
serious harm. This requirement, as applied to Type IIb injunctions, would 
help ensure the judge turns her mind to whether the defendant is merely an 
annoyance	to	the	plaintiff	or	whether	he	is	credible	and	risks	doing	serious	
reputational harm. While Canadian defamation law does not require serious 
harm	(unlike	English	defamation	law),52	the	potential	chilling	effect	of	a	
47. Lord Selkirk School Division et al v Warnock, 2015 MBQB 195 at paras 53-54.
48. RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 SCR 311, 111 DLR (4th) 385.
49. Nalcor Energy v NunatuKavut Community Council Inc, 2014 NLCA 46 at para 65.
50. Ibid at para 56.
51. Ibid at para 65.
52. Defamation Act 2013 (UK), c 26, s.1.
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broad “do not defame” order is such as to warrant additional safeguards 
on the remedy. If the defendant is unlikely to cause serious harm through 
future publication of libels, the remedy of an injunction should not be 
invoked	to	restrict	the	defendant’s	right	to	speak.	It	is	therefore	my	view	
that the law should evolve so as to require likely serious harm before 
speech injunctions should be ordered.
Publication on the internet may result in serious harm, but it should not 
always be inferred that serious harm will result solely because something 
is	published	on	the	internet.	Courts	often	exaggerate	the	harmful	effects	
of internet defamation on reputation.53 Publication on the internet does 
not inevitably lead to widespread and perpetual dissemination, nor is it 
necessarily credible and what is not credible does not threaten reputation.54 
Nevertheless, publication on the internet creates at least the potential for 
dissemination that is broad, in both time and space, in ways that were 
not previously technologically feasible. In addition, search engines help 
decontextualize online content and may more readily connect a libel to an 
individual. Thus, internet publication may help justify the need for a Type 
IIb injunction. This is not to suggest that it is sufficient to warrant such an 
injunction.
For example, many of the defendants who would be subject to Type 
IIb injunctions are not credible precisely because they make a wide range 
of unrelated and unpredictable defamatory statements. While on their face 
these statements may allege serious impropriety, all things being equal, the 
more	varied	the	allegations	a	defendant	makes	against	a	plaintiff,	the	less	
credible they will be. This is true regardless of whether publication is on 
the internet. Courts should carefully consider whether such allegations are 
actually	a	threat	to	the	plaintiff’s	reputation.	Courts	are	often	not	inclined	
to seriously consider issues of credibility and persuasiveness in assessing 
whether disparaging remarks are defamatory.55 Barrick Gold v Lopehandia 
is an example in which a narrowly tailored injunction would likely not 
have	been	effective,	given	the	wide	range	of	allegations	made.	However,	
in my view, the accusations were not credible and thus not defamatory 
precisely because the defendant was accusing Barrick Gold of “fraud 
bigger	than	Enron,”	genocide,	misrepresentation	to	government	officials,	
arson, attempted murder, and manipulating world gold prices.56 
53.	 For	 example,	 I	 find	 convincing	 Robert	 Danay’s	 article,	 “The	Medium	 is	 Not	 the	Message:	
Reconciling	Reputation	and	Free	Expression	in	Cases	of	Internet	Defamation”	(2010)	56	McGill	LJ	1.
54.	 See	 e.g.	 Hilary	Young,	 “But	 Names	Won’t	 Necessarily	 Hurt	Me:	 Considering	 the	 Effect	 of	
Disparaging	Statements	on	Reputation”	(2011)	Queen’s	LJ	37.
55. Ibid at 1-37.
56. Barrick Gold, supra note	6	at	paras	15-16;	see	also	Young	2011,	supra note 54 at 14-15.
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I have suggested that for a Type IIb injunction, there should be a 
likelihood of future defamation, the anticipated imputation(s) should be 
unpredictable	and	different	than	those	already	litigated,	and	there	should	
be	no	adequate	alternative	remedies.	This	simply	reflects	the	existing	rules	
governing equitable remedies. I have additionally suggested that the law 
should	 evolve	 to	 require	 serious	 harm,	 and	 this	 would	 not	 be	 satisfied	
solely on the basis of online publication. 
Yet Type IIb injunctions are regularly ordered in circumstances in 
which these requirements are not met. As noted above, they constituted 
19/26	 (73	per	 cent)	 of	Type II injunctions	or	 19/62	 (31	per	 cent)	 of	 all	
injunctions in my study. They were the most common type of injunction. 
I examined each Type II injunction to see whether the criteria above 
(excluding serious harm, since the law does not require it) were made 
out. I wanted to know whether a narrower order could reasonably have 
been drafted. Because these determinations are subjective and, in my case 
based	solely	on	 the	reasons	for	 judgment,	 I	erred	on	the	side	of	finding	
the	broader	 injunction	to	be	justified.	Specifically,	I	categorized	each	of	
the 26 Type II injunctions as either one in which a narrower injunction 
could clearly have been crafted, or one in which it was less clear that a 
narrower injunction could have been crafted. I categorized conservatively, 
placing any case in which a wide range of defamatory statements had been 
made in the latter category unless it seemed there was no likelihood of 
repetition.57 When in doubt, I assumed an injunction was appropriate and 
simply focused on whether the scope of the injunction could be narrowed. 
Of course, it is always the case that a narrower injunction is possible. 
For example, Type IV injunctions	are	limited	to	the	specific	imputations	
found to be defamatory. But again, the point was to see whether, if one 
thinks Type II (that is, IIb)	 injunctions	are	justifiable	where	it	 is	hard	to	
predict how the defendant will continue to defame, these particular Type II 
injunctions	are	justified.
I	 found	 that	 14/26	 (54	per	 cent)	 of	Type II orders could easily and 
reasonably	 have	 been	 narrowed	 to	 enjoin	 the	 repetition	 of	 specific	
imputations.	For	the	other	12/26	(46	per	cent),	it	was	either	difficult	to	say	
or there was a range of defamatory imputations at issue. 
An example of a clearly unnecessary Type II injunction is that in 
Michie:
Jodi Lynn Guthrie-Waters a.k.a. Jodi Lynn Michie is hereby restrained 
from publishing, or causing to be published, on the internet or by any other 
57. See e.g. Farallon Mining Ltd v Arnold, 2011 BCSC 1532 at paras 74, 116.
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method or medium, whether by name, pseudonym, address, photograph 
or other means of identity, any defamatory statement referring in any 
way to James Alexander Michie.58
In	this	case,	the	defendant	had	published	one	specific	allegation	(that	her	
husband had committed fraud) by e-mail to one person who had, at the time 
of publication, already published an article containing the same imputation. 
The court found this warranted damages of only one dollar. 59 The court did 
not mention any evidence of likely repetition, nor was there any issue of 
content removal, since publication was by e-mail. Based on information 
available in the judgment, the test for any permanent injunction was not 
met. But even if it were, the fact that there was a single narrow imputation 
made by the defendant, and no evidence of likely repetition, means that a 
Type IIb injunction	was	not	justified.




held to be defamatory (i.e. a Type IV injunction). Further, there was no 
indication of a likelihood of repetition of this libel, let alone of any others. 
On the contrary, there was a partial correction and an attempt to remove 
the incorrect content from the internet.60 As with Michie, based on the 
information in the judgment, no injunction should have been granted at all 
but certainly one could have been more narrowly tailored to the kind of 
imputations the impugned publication made.
Examples	where	the	resort	to	Type II injunctions is at least arguably 
justifiable	include	Griffin v Sullivan:61
[35] Included in the many statements published by the defendant of and 
concerning	the	plaintiff,	are	statements	which	I	find	convey	the	following	
meanings:
(a)	 that	 the	 plaintiff	 has	 verbally	 abused	 many	 persons	 and	 has	
enjoyed	doing	so;






58. Michie v Guthrie-Waters, 2012 BCSC 793 at para 61.
59. Ibid at para 60.
60. Kim, supra note 34 at para 56.
61. Griffin v Sullivan, 2008 BCSC 827 at paras 35-36.




(i)	 that	 the	 plaintiff	 has	 committed	 criminal	 offences	 in	 Canada	













(p)	 that	 the	 plaintiff	 is	 a	 paedophile,	 a	 sexual	 pervert,	 a	 sexual	
predator and a date rapist.
[36] In my opinion, all of the above meanings conveyed by the 




While it is possible to craft a Type IV injunction enjoining repeating 
these imputations, the breadth of allegations and evidence that the 
defendant is likely to continue defaming in the absence of an injunction 
may justify a Type II injunction. As noted above, however, I would like to 
see a serious harm threshold met before Type II injunctions are granted. 
3. Type III
Type III injunctions are narrower than Type I and Type II but are still 
overbroad. Recall that these are orders not to say x, where x has not been 
found to be defamatory. For example, they may require a whole website 
to be taken down when only part of the site is defamatory. Or they may 
enjoin publication of an imputation not yet found to be defamatory. All 
interlocutory	injunctions	that	refer	to	specific	imputations	(as	opposed	to	
enjoining	defamatory	speech	or	all	speech	about	the	plaintiff)	are	Type III. 
Like Type I they may capture lawful speech and like Type IV, discussed 
below,	they	do	not	reflect	the	fact	that	the	law	is	highly	context-dependent,	
such that the same imputation may be defamatory in one context and not 
in another. 
There	is	little,	if	any,	justification	for	permanent	Type III orders which 
enjoin speech not found to be defamatory despite an adjudication on the 
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merits. If an imputation is alleged to be defamatory and is sought to be 
enjoined, it should be proven to be defamatory before it is permanently 
enjoined. If the risk is of future libels, the order can be narrowed to refer 
to defamatory imputations—either Type IIb or Type IV. Interlocutory Type 
III	 injunctions	are	more	justifiable,	but	 the	very	high	threshold	for	such	
injunctions should nevertheless be met.62
Type III injunctions	effectively	presume	that	a	particular	 imputation	
will be defamatory if published in the future, regardless of the context, but 
this need not be established for an order to have been violated. Caution is 
therefore warranted. One cannot assess whether something is defamatory 
from words or their imputations alone. Context is vitally important. A 
statement thought to be false today may turn out to be true tomorrow.63 
A statement that is libelous when spoken at a press conference may be 
privileged when spoken in the Legislature. A statement made by a notorious 
liar may not be credible while the same words spoken by a respected public 
figure	may	 be	 devastating.	Context	 is	 even	more	 important	 now	 that	 a	
defence of responsible communication is available. In such circumstances, 
liability	 may	 be	 avoided	 because	 of	 the	 defendant’s	 due	 diligence,	
regardless of what imputations were made. All this to say, permanent 
Type III injunctions are problematic because they assume that a court can 
determine in advance, and without any context, whether a statement will 
be defamatory. This is simply false. However, the one advantage of Type 
III orders over Type II orders is that they give the defendant notice of what 
they	must	not	say.	Thus,	where	a	specific	imputation	is	predicted,	and	it	




of all elements and no defences being made out, in the context in which it 
is likely to be published. This comes close to an order not to defame, like a 
Type IIb order,	except	that	it	is	specific	to	particular	imputations.	
Type III	injunctions	were	rare	in	the	reported	decisions:	9/62	or	15	per	
cent. Palen v Dagenais included the following term:
(1) Pending judgment at trial or until further order of this court, the 
defendant Arthur Dagenais is hereby prohibited and enjoined from:
(a) making further criminal or discipline complaints against Palen 
to any authorities provided such complaints stem from the vehicle 
62. Canada Metal, supra note 14.
63. More likely, a statement that was always true but could not be proven to be true in one case may 
be proven to be true in another.
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inspection	on	October	26,	2007;	and
(b) making accusations to anyone that Palen assaulted him using a 
taser	device	or	attempted	to	murder	him	on	that	date;…64
This order is much narrower than many others discussed in this 
article	 and	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 the	 plaintiff	 had	 sought	 a	 Type II 
injunction. However, the judge considered that too broad because the 
original publication was limited to “police circles,” because of the speech-
infringing nature of a Type II injunction	and	because	of	the	difficulty	of	
wording the order so that the defendant knows what is prohibited.65
And yet the ordered injunction was still unnecessarily broad. The 
relevant	 defamatory	 statements	 were	 that	 a	 police	 officer	 assaulted	
and attempted to murder Dagenais. The order enjoins all allegations of 
criminality and discipline complaints arising from the vehicle inspection, 
not	only	that	the	officer	tried	to	assault/taser/kill	the	defendant.	As	such	it	
includes	specific	imputations	not	found	to	be	defamatory.	
Another Type III injunction was even more problematic from a 
freedom of expression perspective. The judge in Henderson v Pearlman 
made the following order:




(d) any information relating to the status, lifestyle, personal 
activities	or	business	of	the	plaintiff;	and
(e)	 any	other	information	that	is	defamatory	of	the	plaintiff.66
In addition to including a Type IIb term, the order enjoins the entire 
content of articles and material pertaining to articles, not just their 
defamatory content. It also includes all information “relating to the status, 
lifestyle,	personal	activities	or	business	of	the	plaintiff.”	On	its	face	this	
includes information that does not have a defamatory meaning, and 
defamatory information that is defensible because it is true, for example. 
The	order	is	unjustifiably	broad.
4. Type IV
Type IV is the narrowest and least problematic type of injunction. It is 
like Type IIb in that Type IV injunctions only enjoin defamatory speech. 
However,	such	injunctions	are	narrower	in	that	they	enjoin	only	specific	
64. Palen v Dagenais, 2012 SKQB 383 at para 40.
65. Ibid at para 36.
66. Henderson v Pearlman, 2009 CanLII 43641 at para 55, [2009] OJ No 3444.
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words or imputations already found to be defamatory rather than the entire 
scope	of	what	would	be	defamatory	of	the	plaintiff.	Thus,	with	mandatory	
Type IV orders, unlike Type IIb orders, there is no uncertainty about whether 
the publication is defamatory in context because a court has already ruled 
on this. With prohibitive orders, there is still a possibility that what was 
found defamatory in one context is not defamatory in another. 
In the American context, Type IV usually refers to orders not to repeat 
the	 specific	 words	 or	 imputations	 held	 to	 be	 defamatory.	 Because	 he	
focuses on prior restraint, Ardia does not seem to include, within Type IV, 
orders to take down, remove or delete defamatory speech that has already 
been published. 
Ardia, while not necessarily opposed to Type IV (do not repeat) 
injunctions, notes that they may still be overbroad. His concern relates 
to	 how	 the	 defamatory	 imputation	 is	 defined.	He	 provides	 an	 example	
from Griffis v Luban	in	which	enjoining	the	imputation	that	the	plaintiff	
was a liar was unnecessarily broad because it was not limited to lying in 
the particular context of the defamation litigation – in this case, whether 
the	 plaintiff	 had	 lied	 about	 her	 credentials	 as	 an	Egyptologist.	 It	 could	
be,	for	example,	 that	 the	plaintiff	did or will lie about something else.67 
Prohibiting	the	defendant	from	calling	the	plaintiff	a	liar	in	any	context	is	
therefore too broad. 
But this problem is not inherent to Type IV injunctions. If orders are 
well-crafted so as to make clear that they enjoin only the repetition of the 
litigated defamatory imputations, perhaps only in circumstances in which 
they remain libelous, the overbreadth objection disappears.
Doug Rendleman essentially argues in favour of Type IV injunctions.68 
Chemerinsky, as noted above, considers all defamation injunctions 
prohibiting	future	speech	to	be	unconstitutional	in	the	US.	Specifically,	he	
considers Type IV injunctions involving future rather than past speech to 
be	unconstitutional	because	they’re	ineffective:	“Any	effective	injunction	
will	be	overbroad,	and	any	limited	injunction	will	be	ineffective.”69 While 
I agree that Type IV injunctions	may	sometimes	be	ineffective,	there	are	
other situations in which the defendant is likely to repeat her libel, or in 
which a publication found to be defamatory should be taken down, and 
an	 injunction	 could	 be	 effective.	 Since	 I	 have	 suggested	 that	 Type IIb 
injunctions are sometimes necessary and should therefore be permissible, 
67. Ardia, supra note 1 at 57, citing Griffis v Luban, No CX-01-1350, 2002 WL 338139, (Minn Ct 
App Mar 5, 2002).
68. Rendleman, supra note 8 at e.g. 675.
69. Chemerinsky, supra note 1 at 171.
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that must also be true of narrower Type IV injunctions, under similar 
circumstances.
To be clear, such injunctions should not be ordered as a matter of course 
where	there	is	a	finding	of	liability.	The	usual	remedy	for	defamation	is	
damages, not injunctive relief.70 However, Type IV orders are minimally 
impairing. The main risks are that the injunction was unnecessary, because 
there was no harm of repetition, or that the same words or imputations, 
when	published	 in	a	different	context,	will	no	 longer	be	defamatory.	 In	
the former case the injunction is unlikely to be breached, and so the only 
harm	is	a	chilling	effect,	rather	than	subjecting	the	defendant	to	contempt	
proceedings. 
The latter risk raises the issue of whether one should be found 
in contempt for repeating an imputation that was earlier found to be 
defamatory, but that is not actually defamatory in the context of the 
repetition. For example, if between the time the injunction was ordered 
and the imputation was repeated, it became clear that the imputation found 
to be defamatory was in fact true, the order would be breached though the 
second publication is not defamatory. In my view, such repetition does, but 
should not violate the order. 
A way to avoid that outcome is to make it an implicit or explicit term 
of the order that the repetition itself be defamatory. This could complicate 
contempt proceedings since there may be uncertainty as to what is 
defamatory,	and	it	could	be	said	that	the	defendant	had	insufficient	notice	
of what she was not allowed to say. However, given that publishing only 
particular imputations is enjoined, the risk accompanying such injunctions 
is small. 
For Type IV injunctions, as for Type IIb, there should be a likelihood of 
repetition (i.e. necessity), damages should be inadequate, and there should 
be the prospect of serious reputational harm. Unpredictability in what 
kinds of allegations the defendant will make is not necessary with Type IV 
injunctions since the scope of such orders is limited to imputations found 
to be defamatory. 
Some courts have framed the rule around permanent injunctions71 in 
defamation as requiring a likelihood the libel will be repeated, despite 
70.	 The	primacy	of	damages	is	reflected	in	the	fact	that	there	is	an	entitlement	to	damages,	while	
equitable relief is discretionary. For equitable relief, the harm must be irreparable, which is another 
way	of	saying	 that	damages	must	be	 inadequate.	“The	very	first	principle	of	 injunction	 law	is	 that	
prima facie you do not obtain injunctions to restrain actionable wrongs, for which damages are the 
proper remedy” (London and Blackwell Rly Co v Cross, (1886) 31 Ch D 354 per Lindley LJ, 2 TLR 
231).
71. I refer only to permanent injunctions since Type IV will necessarily be permanent injunctions. 
Strictly	speaking	this	is	not	true,	as	a	temporary	order	could	be	made	after	a	finding	of	liability.	But	
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a	finding	of	liability,	or	a	“real	possibility”	the	plaintiff	will	not	recover	
damages.72 I am opposed to the rule that permits anti-speech injunctions 
based solely on impecuniosity.73 For present purposes, however, I will 
simply	 say	 that	 a	 likelihood	 of	 repetition,	 despite	 a	 finding	 of	 liability,	
should always be required. So too should serious and irreparable 
harm. Given the way that content on the internet can spread and be de-
contextualized by search engines, internet publications will often satisfy 
these criteria for a Type IV takedown	order.	So	too,	of	course,	may	offline	
publications. 
Type IV injunctions	made	up	17/62	or	27	per	cent	of	injunctions.	For	
example, in Awan v Levant, the court ordered that: “[t]o the extent that 
I have found the words complained of to be defamatory, they should be 
taken	 down	 from	 the	 defendant’s	 website.”74 While the judge seemed 
attuned to the need to avoid an overly broad order, there was no discussion 
of whether damages would have been an adequate remedy. 
An example of a do-not-repeat Type IV order is that in Nazerali v 
Mitchell prohibiting the defendant from “publishing on the Internet or 
elsewhere the defamatory words described in paragraph 3 of the Reasons 
for Judgment herein…”75 Note that the original injunction in Nazerali was 
a Type IIb (do not defame) order, but this was narrowed on appeal to a Type 
IV and, in addition, the geographical scope of the order was narrowed.76 
Other	 courts	 go	 beyond	 the	 specific	 defamatory	 words	 and	 enjoin	
publishing words with similar imputations to those found defamatory.77
Some courts explicitly acknowledge the need for an injunction due to a 
likelihood of repetition. For example, in Cragg v Stephens the court states: 
“I conclude that there is a reasonable apprehension that Ms. Stephens will 
continue	with	her	campaign	against	the	plaintiffs	and	continue	to	defame	





interlocutory injunctions that are ordered before the merits are assessed.
72. St. Lewis, supra note 45 at para 13, citing Astley v Verdun, 2011 ONSC 3651 at para 21.
73. According to Chemerinsky: “there is a particular danger in allowing injunctions as a remedy in 
defamation cases because of the inadequacy of money damages,” supra note 1 at 170.
74. Awan v Levant,	2014	ONSC	6890	at	para	214,	aff’d	Awan v Levant, 2016 ONCA 970.
75. Nazerali v Mitchell, 2018 BCCA 104 at para 117.
76. Ibid at paras 103-109.
77.	 Eg	Cragg v Stephens, 2010 BCSC 1177 at para 40.
78. Ibid.
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Finally, I wish to note one last reason for concern with regard to the 
scope	of	defamation	injunctions.	Because	plaintiffs	usually	draft	orders,	
there is a risk they will be inappropriately broad or vague unless opposing 
counsel objects to their scope. Unsurprisingly, then, the broadest orders 
seem to be made where defendants are self-represented or do not appear. 
For example, of the ten Type I (i.e. do-not-say-anything-about-the-
plaintiff)	injunctions	in	the	data	set,	nine	were	ordered	in	cases	with	either	
a self-represented defendant or where there was default judgment. Almost 
three	quarters	(19/26)	of	Type II (do not defame) injunctions were ordered 
in cases in which the defendant was self-represented or there was default 
judgment. For Type IV,	 the	 narrowest	 and	most	 justifiable injunctions, 
only	 about	 half	 (9/17)	 involved	 a	 self-represented	 defendant	 or	 default	
judgment. The numbers are small, and there is no evidence of statistical 
significance.79	However,	 it	would	be	unsurprising	to	find	that	 injunction	
orders are more narrowly tailored where defence counsel is involved. To 
be sure, judges should not grant problematic orders even if there is no 
defence counsel, but that seems more likely to happen in the absence of 
an adversarial process. This suggests an even greater need for judges and 
lawyers to carefully consider the proper scope of injunctions.
Conclusion
Type I injunctions,	which	prohibit	saying	anything	about	the	plaintiff,	are	
clearly overbroad and should never be ordered. Yet they make up 16 per cent 
of the injunctions in my study. Type II, which prohibit further defamation, 
raise	 two	 issues.	The	 first	 is	 that	 they	may	 prohibit	 lawful	 conduct	 by	
enjoining speech with defamatory meaning but that may be defensible. 
These are called Type IIa injunctions. There may also be ambiguity as 
to whether “defamatory” means “has a defamatory meaning” (Type IIa) 
or	“satisfies	 the	elements	of	defamation	and	no	defences	are	made	out”	
(which I call Type IIb). Assuming no ambiguity, Type IIb injunctions are 
less problematic, in that they do not proscribe lawful speech. However, 
they are vague in that they do not put the defendant on notice as to what 
counts as defamation. Type II injunctions	were	26/62	(42	per	cent)	of	the	
orders	in	the	data	set,	with	at	least	7/62	(11	per	cent)	being	Type IIa and 
19/62	(31	per	cent)	Type IIb (or ambiguous as to whether Type IIa or b). It 
is	admittedly	difficult	to	craft	a	narrower	and	effective	order	in	cases	where	
defendants make a range of allegations. Yet in my view, this problem 
79. A standard χ2 test of the null hypothesis (that there is no correlation between the type of injunction 
and whether the defendant was self-represented or there was default judgment) was inconclusive. 
χ2(2,	53)	=	4.361,	p	=	0.1130.	This	means	that	there	is	no	statistically	significant	relationship	between	
type of injunction and type of representation if the 0.05 threshold is used. 
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only	justifies	the	imposition	of	a	Type IIb injunction where, in addition to 
necessity, there is a real risk of serious reputational harm. Otherwise, the 
preferable approach is to order damages and if the defendant continues 
to	defame	the	plaintiff,	to	bring	a	new	action.	Many	(47	per	cent)	of	the	
Type IIb orders in the database were not ones in which a wide range of 
allegations	had	been	made;	they	were	ones	in	which	a	narrower	injunction	
could	have	been	crafted	with	little	difficulty.
Type III orders, which prohibit saying x when x has not been found to 
be	defamatory,	are	rarely	if	ever	justifiable.	They	constituted	15	per	cent	of	
the data set. Type IV	injunctions,	which	enjoin	specific	imputations	found	
to	be	defamatory,	are	sometimes	justifiable.	This	is	particularly	so	if	they	
are understood to require that the impugned speech be defamatory in the 
context in which it is repeated. Further, there must be reason to believe the 
defendant	will	continue	to	defame,	despite	a	finding	of	liability,	and	this	
would cause serious and irreparable harm. 27 per cent of the injunctions 
in the data set were Type IV. The main conclusion of this article is that that 
number should be much closer to 100 per cent. 
The apparent correlation between overly broad injunctions and self-
representation or default judgment is worth investigating further as, if 
established,	 it	would	 suggest	 that	 defendants’	 freedom	of	 expression	 is	
impaired	to	a	greater	extent	when	they	don’t	have	legal	counsel.	And	if	
established, it would be problematic, particularly given that some courts 
have stated that the inability to pay damages is a factor that could, on its 
own, justify a permanent injunction. 
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